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I. INTRODUCTION
In a 1975 California case, Eskaton v. Driver,1 a group of hos-
pitals brought claims against several hundred participants in a bank-
rupt health maintenance organization by suing five participants both
individually and as representatives of all participants who had used
the hospitals' facilities. Eskaton was a defendant class action, a pro-
cedural device that allows one who has a common grievance against a
multitude of persons to resolve the whole dispute by suing only a few
members of the "class." If the chosen few represent the class ade-
quately, all class members are bound by the resolution of the common
issues.2
Plaintiff begins the action by selecting representatives from among
the class members and serving them with process in the same fashion
that parties defendant would be served in a nonclass suit. The mechan-
ics of the subsequent possible steps-class certification, notice to absen-
tees, exclusion of, or intervention by absentees, litigation of common
issues, settlement proposal and approval-are virtually the same for
defendant and plaintiff class actions. The significant difference comes
at the very end of the proceedings. Provided individual issues were
not left to be resolved outside the class proceeding, a judgment in favor
of a plaintiff class is enforceable against the defendants just as in a
nonclass suit. A judgment against a defendant class, however, is no
more than a declaration of rights or duties on common issues. 3
Plaintiffs have found defendant class actions increasingly useful
in recent years4-useful in prosecuting claims that otherwise would
* Member, Arizona and Illinois Bars. Mr. Wolfson is associated with the firm of O'Connor,
Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, Phoenix, Arizona.
1. Civil No. 257-471 (Sacramento County, Calif. Super. Ct. Oct. 10. 1975).
2. See notes 17-36 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text. When monetary relief is sought, plaintiff
must later bring collateral suits against the various defendants individually to execute on the
judgments.
4. See, e.g., the following defendant class actions: Trainor v. Hernandez, 97 S. Ct. 1911.
(1977); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co.. 508 F.2d 226 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Express"ays.
494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974); Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101 (D.D.C. 1976); Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223
(N.D. Ind. 1976); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398 (W.D. Mich. 1976); Bradford Trust
Co. v- Wright, 70 F.R.D. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Redhail v. ZablockL 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D.
Wis. 1976); Tucker v. City Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494 (M.D. Ala. 1976): United States v.
Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10 (D. Nev. 1975); Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522
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be economically infeasible;5 in overcoming troublesome venue and
jurisdictional requirements;6 in avoiding statute of limitations prob-
7.lems; in preventing the doctrine of collateral estoppel from eliminat-
ing a cause of action against a multitude of persons by a single adverse
result in a suit against one of them;8 and in avoiding being subject to
incompatible decrees from successive suits brought by several mem-
bers of a group of similarly situated persons.9
Despite the advantages of the defendant class suit and its avail-
ability for several centuries,10 few have understood or used it until
recently. There are undeniably problems in any defendant class action,
but they are not insurmountable. Although adequate representation
is said to be assured in plaintiff class actions, some authorities con-
(D. Ind. 1975); Jones v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dcv., 68 F.R.D. 60 (E.D. La.
1975); Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581 (E.D, Pa, 1975).
Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442
(E.D. Va. 1975); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Va. 1975); Manning v. Palmer. 381
F. Supp. 713 (D. Ariz. 1974); Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Taliaferro
v. State Council of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1974); Chevalier v, Baird
Say. Ass'n, 371 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Arenson v. Board of Trade, 372 F. Supp.
1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Kane v. Fortson, 369 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Gv. 1973); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369
F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 1lS,
1039 (1974); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor &
Fin. Co., 57 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D, Mo. 1Q72);
Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Northern Cheyenne Tribe
v. Hollowbreast, 349 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Mont. 1972); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 60 F.R.,,
359 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435 (WD. Pa. 1972): Pennsylvania
v. Local 542, Operating Eng'rs, 347 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Dale Elec., Inc. v. R.CL,
Elec., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971), order rescinded on other grounds, 178 U.SP.Q. 525
(D.N.H. 1973); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss. 1971), vacated on merits,
405 U.S. 1036 (1972); Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa, 1971); Management Televi-
sion Sys., Inc. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Bourns, Inc. v. Allen
Bradley Co., 173 U.S.P.Q. 567 (N.D. Il1. 1971), dismissed on other grounds, 348 F. Supp. 554
(N.D. I11. 1972), modfied, 480 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1973); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181
(E.D. Va. 1970); Union Pac. R.R. v. Woodahl, 308 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1970); United States
v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Research Corp. v. Piister Associated Growers, Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Il1. 1969), appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); Anderson v.
Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Hadnott v. Amos, 295 F. Supp. 1003 (M,D. Ala,
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v.
Methode Elec., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Iii. 1968); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp,
Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 598 (1968);
Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), affd pet curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968);
Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal Rptr. 639 (1971); 1skaton v.
Driver, Civil No. 257-471 (Sacramento Cty., Calif. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1975); Kronisch v. Howard
Say. Inst., 133 N.J. Super. 124, 335 A.2d 587 (1975).
5. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 68-71 infra and accompanying text. In Dale Elec., Inc. v. R.C.L llee,
Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 543 (D.N.H. 1971), order rescinded on other grounds, 178 U.SP.Q. 525
(D.N.H. 1973) the court, holding that joinder of twenty-three dcfendants was impracticable for
purposes of certifying a defendant class action, stated: "In the instant case . . . the location of
the defendants ranges from California to New York and from North Carolina to Nebraska,
Joinder is not only impracticable, but impossible."
7. See notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 72-74 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 75-82 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 19-31 infra and accompanying text.
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
sider adequate representation in defendant class actions impossible."
Whereas the prospect of a fund to compensate class counsel appears to
hold the plaintiff class suit together,12 the defendant class has no such
ready device. Thus, the reluctant defendant-representative fares badly
in comparison with the eager plaintiff class champion.' 3  Whatever
utility defendant class actions are thought to have is considered by
some to be lost by the possibility of defendant class members opting
out. 14 In addition, due process concerns have at times inhibited the use
of the defendant class action.
5
This article will demonstrate that the defendant class action is a
useful device. The first part of the article will deal with the effect of
the judgment on absent defendants and will indicate that previous
concerns regarding due process are unwarranted. Next, the ad-
vantages of a defendant class action are examined to show that in
some instances it may be the only feasible manner in which to pro-
ceed. Finally, the problems of adequate representation and exclusion
are analyzed and the conclusion is reached that the device's utility can
be employed without sacrificing adequate representation, and it is not
impaired by the possibility of exclusion.
II. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT
A. Who is Bound
The utility of a defendant class action is destroyed if the judg-
ment that is rendered against the representatives does not also de-
termine the issues with respect to the absent defendants. Collateral
proceedings are far more likely in defendant class actions than in
plaintiff class actions because they must be used to enforce the judg-
ment. 1 6 Thus, the questions whether absentees are bound by class ad-
judication and the extent to which they are bound are more significant
in defendant class actions.
The Anglo-American legal tradition generally limits the res judi-
cata effect of the judgment to parties that have been given a chance
to participate in the trial. This principle has been embodied in the
United States Constitution in the due process requirements of notice
and an opportunity to be heard.1 7  An analysis of the historical de-
velopment of the defendant class, action, however, reveals that, as-
11. See authorities cited in note 85 infra.
12. See notes 111-12 infra and accompanying text.
13. See authorities cited in note 85 infra.
14. See notes 131-32 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 37-44 infra and accompanying text.
16. The plaintiff cannot simply execute on the judgment. See notes 47.48 inra and
accompanying text.
17. Due process requirements must be interpreted in light of the Constitution's common-
law antecedents. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237. 24243 (1895).
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suming adequate representation, 8 this action is an exception to the
general due process mandate. The class suit evolved during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries in the English courts of equity. Earlier
Chancery practice had required plaintiff to bring before the court all
persons interested in the subject matter of the suit. This compulsory
joinder rule was occasioned by courts' refusal to render decrees affect-
ing a person's rights except in his presence 9 and by courts' desire to re-
solve entire disputes at one time.20  The English Chancery Court,
however, in several cases reported before the enactment of the Con-
stitution, held absent defendant class members bound by the judg-
ment.
The English chancellors came to recognize that when parties on
either side of a controversy were numerous, strict application of
equity's compulsory joinder rule could leave plaintiff without a remedy.
particularly because jurisdiction typically required the physical pre-
sence of the parties before the court.21 Consequently, the chancellors
18. The problems of adequate representation are discussed in section IV. infra.
19. The common-law requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard have long been
held embodied by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Iowa Cent.
Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389 (1896).
20. See generally F. CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON TiE LAW RESPECTIN PARtiLS To
SUITS IN EQUITY 2-3, 13 (2d ed. 1847); J. STORY, COMIENTARIIS ON EQUITY PLtADINOS 74
(10th ed. 1892) [hereinafter cited as STORY]. At law, every effort was made to confine considera-
tion to a single disputed issue, with choice of the proper writ being all-important. At law, unlike
equity, only those with a direct legal interest in the subject matter of the suit were proper parties.
STORY, supra, at 77. The differences in approach between the courts may well have been, as
some commentators assert, a function of the different nature of legal and equitable remedies,
Lewis, Mandatory Joinder of Parties in Civil Proceedings: the Cas. for Analytical Pragtnatlsm.
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 381, 384 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lewis]; Feed, Compulsory Joinder of
Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 331, 483 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Reed], al-
though it should be noted that equity could render a decree for payment of money (in trust sur-
charge matters, for example) just as the law courts could. With the merger of law and equity, the
equity rule was generally adopted. Reed, supra, at 331.
Since the eighteenth century, problems that engendered cla:,s actions have diminished.
Service of process by sheriff, or private process server, or mail for n personam actions have re-
placed arrest of the defendant so that it is now less difficult to bring persons before the court.
Courts today are more willing to do justice between the parties before them without compel-
ling joinder of others. See generally Hazard, Indispensable Part': the Historical Oriin of a
Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1961); Lewis, supra. &ut see Reed supra, at 329.
Just as old problems began to disappear, however, the multi-jurisdictional nature of our
judicial system created new ones. See notes 68-70 infra and accompanying text.
21. The common law had, in the semi-criminal action of tre!;pass vi et armis, an action
in which process followed the criminal model. See 3 W. HOLDSWOItTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 626 (5th ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH]. The action was commenced by a
writ of capias ad respondendum, which commanded the sheriff to take defendant and keep
him safely so that he may have his body before the court on a certain day to answer the plaintiff
in the action. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *282. The writ notified the defendant to
defend the action and procured defendant's arrest until security for the plaintiff's claim was
furnished.
In the thirteenth century, the writ of capias ad respondendum was extended to actions of
account (52 Henry III c.23); in the fourteenth century to actions of debt, detinue, and replevin
(25 Edward III c.17); and at the beginning of the sixteenth century to actions on the ease
(19 Henry VII c.9). 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 231.
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held that "[w]here it is impracticable the rule shall not be pressed.
...The Court therefore has required so many, that it can be justly
said, they will fairly and honestly try the legal right between them-
selves, all other persons interested, and the Plaintiff."22  The class
action was a device that gave plaintiff its remedy without leaving
those who might be affected by the outcome of the suit-absentee
defendants or plaintiffs-unprotected.
In Brown v. Vermuden,23 for example, a vicar brought suit in 1676
to enforce a judgment rendered in an earlier defendant class proceed-
ing 4 in which the right of the church to collect tithes from miners in a
parish had been declared. The chancery court in the collateral pro-
ceeding held defendant bound by the decree rendered in the original
suit despite the plea that defendant was "not Party or privy" to the
suit.25  In Brown v. Booth,26 the vicar of another parish brought suit
in 1690 against several miners to enforce an earlier decree that "all
the miners within the said parish, as well for the time being, as to
come, should pay the tenth dish of lead-ore .. . to the vicar .. . for
tithes. 27 Defendants in the second suit were held bound even though
some of them had neither notice nor opportunity to be heard in the
original class suit.
In an early eighteenth century case, City of London v. Perkins,2
defendant importers were held bound by a prior decree rendered in
what appears to have been a defendant class suit29 brought by the city
to establish its rights to collect duties on all cheese imported into the
city. Likewise, in Cort v. Birkbeck,30 a decree establishing a custom
that all inhabitants of Manchester send their corn to be ground at the
plaintiff's mills was held binding on "all persons under the same
description with the original defendants. 31
In the United States, the constitutional due process require-
ments mandate that a person normally cannot be bound by an in
personam judgment in an action to which neither he nor his privies
22. Adair v. New River Co., 32 Eng. Rep. 1153, 1159 (Ch. 1805).
23. 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676).
24. The report reads: "[The plaintiffs] Predecessor, sued divers Miners there, grounding
his Suit by Prescription. Four Persons were named by the miners to defend the Suit for them."
Id. at 797. It is not clear whether the suit was brought as a class action or whether some of
the defendants agreed to be bound by a trial suit. The former seems more likely because the
defendant in the collateral proceeding was not a party to any agreement.
25. Id.
26. 23 Eng. Rep. 720 (Ch. 1690).
27. Id. at 720-21. The reason so many party defendant class actions were brought for
tithes seems to be that it was never held necessary that plaintiff establish his right at law before
going to equity for a decree, unlike non-tithe cases.
28. 1 Eng. Rep. 1524 (Ex. 1734).
29. City of London v. Perkins (Court of Exchequer 1722) (unreported). This case is
discussed in Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 25 Eng. Rep. 946 (Ch. 1737).
30. 99 Eng. Rep. 143 (K.B. 1779).
31. Id. at 145 n.13.
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:459
have been made parties.32  For a judgment to be valid, so that it may
be enforced or pleaded as a bar, 3 the parties normally must be given
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and the court rendering
the judgment must have legitimately exercised its power over the
parties. In the English tradition, however, the rights to notice and
hearing on an individual basis yield to convenience and necessity in
class actions.3 4  In both defendant and plaintiff class suits, 35 adequate
representation of absentees has been held a sufficient substitute for at
least the first due process requirement: individual notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard. As the Supreme Court noted in Hansberry v. Lee,
36
when the interests of absent persons are adequately represented in a
class suit, those persons will be bound by the judgment in the action.
Commentators have asserted, however, that adequate representation
in defendant class actions is an insufficient substitute for individual
notice and hearing.37 Several commentators have expressed the
opinion that in Christopher v. Brusselback38 the Supreme Court held
that the jurisdiction of federal equity courts to render a decree bind-
ing upon absent defendants extends only to the defendants' interest
in property within the jurisdiction of the court. 39 This erroneous con-
32. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). It may beg the question somewhat to ask who
are privies. Privity has been said to be merely a short-hand way of declaring that under the
particular circumstances of a case, a person is bound by, or entitled to the benefits of, the
rules of res judicata. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83, comment a (1942). Privies generally
are held to include successors in interest, persons whose interests are represented, and non-
parties who openly control the prosecution or defense of proceedings,
33. The Constitution requires that: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S, CONsM
art. IV, § 1. If a state court judgment is sought to be enforced in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1970) dictates the same result as the full faith and credit clause. When the original judgment
is rendered by a federal court and enforcement is sought in a state court or in another federal
court, the doctrine of res judicata applies. Seemingly, federal standards of res judicata obtain,
at least when the initial suit involved a federal question. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 US, 165
(1938).
34. Determinations of persons owning estates in land often present another instance,
The same policy that allows absentees to be bound in class actions permits the rules of res
judicata to operate against persons who have future interests in hnd but who cannot be made
parties either because their identities are not ascertainable or because they are not yet in
existence. In general, these persons are bound when parties whose interests are identical are
parties to the action or when provision is made for the appointment of persons to represent
the holders of future interests. See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 180-86 (1936).
35. For example, in Brown v. Howard, 21 Eng. Rep. 960 (Ch. 1701), a plaintiff class
action brought in the English Chancery Court by a few tenants of a manor against the lord to
settle customs of the manor as to fines, the court stated:
[Ilt was insisted upon, that there being but some of the Tenants Parties to this Bill,
the rest would not be bound by this Trial; but Ld. K. held they would . ..else, where
there are such numbers, no Right could be done, if all must be Parties; for there would
be perpetual Abatements.
36. 311 U.S. 32,41 (1940).
37. See, e.g., 2 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS §§ 2300, 2325 (1977).
38. 302 U.S. 500 (1938).
39. See, e.g., ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION. CLASs ACTIONS
§ 1.5 (1974); Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Clays Action Judqnmcnts, 87
HARV. L. REV. 589, 590 n.10 (1974).
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clusion appears to stem from a misreading of the opinion. The Court,
in speaking of the equity rules it had adopted, stated:
Their purpose was to prescribe the procedure in equity to be followed in
cases within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts and not to enlarge their
jurisdiction. The omission from old Rule 48 . . .of the phrase " ...
the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all absent
parties" preserved unimpaired the jurisdiction of Federal courts of equity
in a class suit to render a decree binding upon absent defendants af-
fecting their interest in property within the jurisdiction of the court.4
What the commentators apparently overlooked was that in Christo-
pher, as clearly appears from the circuit court's opinion in Brusselback
v. Arnovitz,4 1 the class was plaintiff, not defendant. The "absent
defendants" referred to were not class members.
Christopher was an action brought by several creditors of a cor-
poration on behalf of others similarly situated seeking a decree as-
sessing stockholders of the insolvent corporation. There are dozens
of reported cases in which decrees assessing stockholders of insolvent
corporations on unpaid stock subscriptions or other statutory liability
were held conclusive against nonresident stockholders even though
the stockholders had neither been served with process in the state
where the decrees were rendered nor otherwise made parties to the
proceedings.42 As the Supreme Court has noted, binding shareholders
under those circumstances conforms to accepted principles of due
process because the shareholders have voluntarily and knowingly as-
sumed a corporate relationship that is subject to local regulatory
power.43
When that basis for establishing in personam jurisdiction is not
present, absent shareholders will not be bound, in spite of the repre-
sentative nature of the proceedings. The shareholders in Christopher
-the "absent defendants" to whom the Court referred-were held not
bound by the decree in the prior plaintiff class action against the
corporation only because there was no statute to put defendants on
notice that the corporation would stand in judgment for them, and
there existed no other jurisdictional nexus."
B. Preclusion
In addition to the question whether absent defendants are bound,
the extent to which they are to be bound must also be determined. A
class action is no more than a device for resolving in one proceeding
40. 302 U.S. at 505.
41. 87 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1936), revd, 302 U.S. 500 (1937).
42. See Annot., 48 A.L.R. 669 (1927).
43. See, e.g., Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 (1936); Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U.S. 652
(1914); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912).
44. 302 U.S. at 504.
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questions common to a group of people. Thus, absent defendants
should not be affected by results in the class proceeding that are dic-
tated by deficiencies peculiar to the representatives. 45  For instance,
when an offset to class liability is denied because the representative
is guilty of laches or because he compromised his claim against
plaintiff, absentees should not be precluded from asserting the offset.
Likewise, absent defendants are free to Ynterpose defenses pe-
culiar to them. As the English Chancery Court noted in the 1737 case of
Mayor of York v. Pilkington: "Notwithstanding the general right is
tried and established the defendants take advantage of their several
exemptions, or distinct rights., 46  An absentee could assert that
plaintiff released any claims against him or assumed a particular risk
in their relationship, or that plaintiff was guilty of laches or unclean
hands.
Because absent members of what has been certified to be the
defendant class may raise individual defenses--including the defense
that they are not members of the class-the plaintiff that has obtained
judgment for monetary relief will not be able simply to execute on
the judgment against the absentees. 47  It has long been held that,
with respect to absent defendants, an adverse judgment operates only
as a declaration of rights and duties concerning the common issues."
Thus, in a class action by a creditor of a corporation to determine
whether, and in what amount, shareholders are to be assessed, a judg-
ment favorable to the creditor would simply furnish a basis upon
which actions could later be brought against absent class members.
During subsequent proceedings the individual shareholders of the
corporation would be entitled to raise the defenses that they were not
shareholders when the obligation was contracted or that their stock
was fully paid.
45. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 86, comment g (1942).
46. 25 Eng. Rep. 946, 947 (Ch. 1737).
47. Local 500, Bhd. of Painters v. Wise, 269 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. App, 1954), was a de-
fendant class action for libel successfully brought against a labor union. Plaintiff tried to
execute on the judgment against one of the union's members who was not a named party to
the class suit. The court, citing the Restatement of Judgments, directed that plaintill's pro.
ceeding be dismissed:
A court has no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against members of a clas
who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court. It can, however, make
a final determination as to the issues decided in the class action which will be con-
clusive as to those issues not only as to the parties who are personally subject to the
jurisdiction of the court but also as to those who are not so subject.
A judgment in a class action is determinative as to the issues involved, whether
the judgment is in favor of or against the members of the class,
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 26, comment a (1942). See also Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R,D. 14
(N.D. Ohio 1972).
48. See, e.g., Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [19101 2 K. 1021; Commissioner,
of Sewers v. Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610 (1876); Powell v. Powis, 148 Eng. Rep, 627, 630 (Ex. 18201)
Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 25 Eng. Rep. 946, 947 (Ch. 1737).
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The more difficult question relates not to personal claims or de-
fenses but to common issues. Are absentees to be precluded from
later raising common defenses that could have been but were not
raised by the class representative, or are they precluded only from
raising common defenses that were actually litigated by the repre-
sentative and were necessary to the decision in the class suit? Some
courts seem to favor the former rule, while other courts and apparently
the Restatement of Judgments favor the latter.49
The doctrine of res judicata operates to prevent the parties from
asserting what they feel to be the truth. It derives from the notion
that judicial economy as well as fairness to the parties require that
the parties be allowed but one day in court. These considerations
apply to class actions as well as individual suits. With respect to
class actions, considerations of judicial economy and protection of
either the class members or the class opponent dictate that a matter be
settled even though persons affected have had their days in court only
vicariously. The class suit would be of much less practical value if
absent defendants could raise common defenses such as laches,
failure of consideration, statute of limitations, statute of frauds, and
the like, which could have been but were not raised by the class
representative.
A middle ground between the competing interests of final resolu-
tion of a dispute and protection of absent defendants is suggested by
Waybright v. Columbian Mutual Life Insurance Co.50 The underlying
lawsuit, Garland v. Columbian Mutual Life Insurance Co.,51 was a
plaintiff class action brought in Tennessee state court by members of
a fraternal benefit society against the society for an accounting and a
declaration that an assessment was invalid. The action was dismissed,
and another group of members later filed a similar suit in federal
court.52 The federal court of appeals, in affirming dismissal of the case
on the grounds of res judicata, noted that Tennessee 53 followed the
usual rule "that there is an estoppel by judgment when issues which
49. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 86 (1942) and comments thereto. Compare
Commissioners of Sewers v. Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610 (1876) with Conover v. Packanack Lake
Country Club & Community Ass'n, 94 N.J. Super. 275, 228 A.2d 78 (1967).
50. 122 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1941).
51. No. 42370 R.D. (Tenn.) (unreported).
52. 30 F. Supp 885 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).
53. The question of res judicata is determined by reference to the law of the forum in
which the judgment was rendered. The full faith and credit clause does not require that greater
effect be given to a statute or judgment of a state than is given by the courts of that state.
Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439, 443 (1933); Murray v. Louisiana, 347 F.2d
825, 827 (5th Cir. 1965). Thus, when F, requires mutuality of estoppel in a particular instance and
F 2 does not, it would seem that when F2 renders a judgment, F, could not require mutuality al-
though, no doubt, according more weight to a judgment than the forum state would be accord-
ing the judgment. When F, renders a judgment, F2 can choose to require mutuality or not, as it
sees fiL
1977]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
might have been determined in the earlier case are later raised. 54
The circuit court declared that even though different grounds were
raised for invalidating the assessment, they were "like issues.""
The following hypothetical might explain the "like issue" test in
the context of a defendant class action. A company that fabricates
and installs plumbing fixtures in large housing developments is in-
structed by its largest developer customer to have all its employees
sign covenants not to compete with the company for a period of two
years after they leave the company's employ. All the employees
sign. Shortly thereafter, the company informs its employees, all of
whom are union members, that if any group of employees form a
plumbing installation business and hire nonunion employees, the com-
pany will sell them fixtures and secure customers for them. A large
group of employees leave the company and spend considerable
amounts of money equipping their own business. The company sues
several employees as representatives of the group to enjoin the em-
ployees from competing with it.16  The representatives defend on the
grounds that, first, the company caused the employees to change
their position in reliance on the company's actions and thus should be
estopped from asserting the restrictive covenant, and second, because
the employees derived neither additional job security nor any other ad-
vantage from signing the restrictive covenants, the covenants fail for
lack of consideration.
57
If the company prevails, the absent defendants should be fore-
closed from asserting that the company waived the restrictive
covenant or that, because the restrictive covenant was not embodied
in an employment agreement with any substance beyond the cove-
nant itself, the restraint was not ancillary to a genuine contract of
employment or sale of business and hence was an unreasonable re-
straint of trade. The considerations underlying these two defenses and
the facts supporting them are nearly identical to the considerations
and facts associated with the two defenses raised by the class repre-
sentatives.
54. 122 F.2d at 247. The court thus declined to apply merely issue or "collateral"
estoppel.
55. Id.
56. Grand's Plumbing Co. v. Montgomery, Civil No. 322871 (Maricopa County, Arit,
Super. Ct., filed Nov. 6, 1975).
57. As with any other promise, a covenant not to compete s not enforceable unless sup-
ported by consideration. An agreement not to compete entered into after the employment
has commenced is not by that fact alone supported by new consrderation. See, e.g., Kadis v.
Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); Mastrom, Inc. v. Warren, 18 N.C. App. 199, 196
S.E.2d 528 (1973). See generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 825 (1973,. Various benefits conferred
on the employee by a new contract have been held sufficient to constitute consideration, see,
e.g., Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., 285 Ala. 89, 229 So.2d 480 (1969) (new contract provided
for a minimum term of employment of three months); M.S. Jacobs & Assocs., Inc. v. Duffley.
452 Pa. 143, 303 A.2d 921 (1973) (change in employee's status). The mere addition of a notice
provision will not be sufficient. Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314 A2d
279 (1974).
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In spite of its value the "like issue" test might prove difficult to
apply in practice. Are laches and unclean hands like issues? Are
unclean hands and fraud like issues? Are contributory negligence and
assumption of risk like issues? What might be like issues on one set
of facts, might properly be characterized as unlike issues on another.
The difficulty of application may militate in favor of a broader use of
the principles of preclusion. Even when the defenses are plainly dis-
similar it would appear that absentees should be precluded from
raising defenses not raised by the representative. Assuming adequate
representation, absentees appear sufficiently protected to allow a con-
clusion that the advantages of finally resolving common questions in
one lawsuit outweigh the danger to absentees occasioned by not allow-
ing relitigation of common questions. Of course, when the represen-
tative fails to assert a fairly obvious defense his representation be-
comes inadequate, which prevents absentees from being bound.
III. ADVANTAGES OF DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
To demonstrate the advantages of defendant class actions, it is
useful to step into the shoes of the hospitals' counsel in Eskaton to
see what considerations could have led to a defendant class action
rather than one mass nonclass suit against the several hundred par-
ticipants, or several hundred separate suits against the participants
individually.
A. Mass Nonclass Suit
The manageability of a complex multiparty lawsuit is inversely
proportional to the number of lawyers involved. More lawyers mean
more motions, higher xeroxing and mailing costs, lengthier hearings,
more views on how legal issues ought to be resolved, less chance easily
to resolve disputed mechanical and procedural problems, and less
chance to accommodate all parties on one day for depositions and
hearings. Unless the several hundred participants organize and
agree on one or two lawyers, the mass nonclass suit will be a costly,
cumbersome, and lengthy affair.
A defendant class action would save the hospitals service of pro-
cess costs or at least enable them to defer paying those costs until
they are assured of recouping the expense. If the participants are
sued individually, each must be personally served.58 The cost of ser-
vice by sheriff or private process server would probably exceed ten
thousand dollars-a considerable amount of money to risk when the
chances of success are not particularly high. The issue whether partic-
58. In United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10, 16 (D. Nev. 1975),
the court noted that serving the 3800 absent defendants "in the traditional manner" would
take six to twelve months and would involve considerable additional expense.
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ipants of an insolvent health maintenance organization are personally
liable for services provided them is complex and troublesome. In
addition, there is the prospect of an unsympathetic jury in a suit by
large hospitals against a group of individual participants who had
thought themselves insured.
If only five representative participants were sued, however, the
combined cost of personal service on the five and notification by mail
of the rest 9 would be less than two hundred dollars. If the hospitals
prevailed in the class action, they would obtain a declaration "'
against the several hundred participants that, absent personal de-
fenses peculiar to them, each participant would be liable to the hos-
pitals for the amount of his bill. The hospitals would then sue the
participants individually. At this time the participants could argue
that they were not class members, that they were not represented
adequately in the class proceeding, that they already paid their respec-
tive bills, and other individual defenses. The participants would not
be able to relitigate common issues 61 such as whether participants of
a health maintenance organization can be liable to health care pro-
viders when the organization fails.
Although the hospitals would eventually have to bear the consid-
erable expense of service, the expense would be borne only after the
hospitals were assured of obtaining judgments against most partici-
pants and being awarded costs of service as part of the judgments.
In addition, a number of the participants would probably pay the
hospitals voluntarily after notification of the adverse declaration,
thereby avoiding service costs. Legal fees in the subsequent suits
would be minimal because, unless the individual defendants had some
defense or they considered representation inadequate, most of the
remaining participants would probably fail to answer and be de-
faulted.
The class action may have psychological advantages in addition
to the economic benefits just considered. The hospitals' case may be-
59. In federal court class actions brought solely on the b,,sis of common questions of
law or fact, the court: "shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 417
U.S. 156 (1974), the Court held that when the names and addresses of 2,250,000 class members
were easily ascertainable and there was nothing to show that inlividual notice could not be
mailed to each, the "best notice practicable" was individual mailing rather than mailing to a
random sampling and publication for the rest. It should be noted that rule 23(c)(2) is framed
in terms of the court's "directing" notice to absentees rather than the absentees "receiving"
notice.
Rule 23 itself does not require notice in connection with actions brought under subdivisions
(b)(1) or (b)(2). There is a split of authority whether due process requires notice for actions
brought under those two subdivisions or whether it is discretionary as subdivision (d)(2) states,
See note 90 infra.
60. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 49-57 supra and accompanying text.
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come more appealing to a jury by creating the illusion through class
suit that the hospitals are pitted against a monolithic, three hundred
thousand dollar debtor rather than against many individual partici-
pants.62 Hence, even if all the participants could be sued individually
in one lawsuit, class suit is preferable for psychological as well as
economic reasons.
The statute of limitations also poses problems for the mass non-
class suit. The hospitals would have been unable to serve many of
the participants because some had moved and could not be readily
located or because others were evading service. The identity of still
others might not be immediately known. To avoid great delay, it
might be necessary to pursue the litigation against served partici-
pants and bring separate suits against the others as they were found.
The statute of limitations might prevent suits against those partici-
pants that were not found soon enough.6 3  Because fictitious defen-
dants may not be named in federal diversity actions, 64 a defendant
class action is useful to the plaintiff that cannot readily locate or
identify all the defendants. Bringing a defendant class action un-
doubtedly satisfies the statute of limitations requirement of com-
mencing an action with respect to all defendant class members, just
as bringing a plaintiff class action tolls the statute with respect to all
absent plaintiff class members.65  Defendants that cannot be found
immediately can be sought throughout the pendency of the class ac-
tion and afterward. As participants are found, suits utilizing the
declaration obtained can be brought.
B. Separate Actions
Joinder rules may make one nonclass suit impossible. In the ab-
sence of a defendant class action, therefore, the hospital would be
62. When injunctive relief is sought, creation of a large monolithic defendant may have
a negative effect on the court's weighing the harm caused to plaintiff if relief is denied, against
the amount of harm caused to defendant if relief is granted.
63. In state court actions, fictitious defendants can be named. Because fictitious parties
are not permitted in federal diversity actions, see note 64 infra, the federal court plaintiff cannot
skirt the statute of limitations so easily. Even in state court, the fictitious defendants must be
found prior to judgment in the suit.
64. Molnar v. National Broadcasting Co., 231 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1956). The
rationale is that federal courts derive their jurisdiction from the plaintiff's establishing that
plaintiff's citizenship is diverse to all defendants; unless plaintiff demonstrates this in its plead-
ing, the court has no jurisdiction. Some federal court local rules require leave of court for filing
an action based on a federal question in which some defendants are fictitious. See, e.g.. Rules
for the District Court of the District of Arizona, rule 10(d).
65. The courts should hold that filing a class suit tolls the statute of limitations at least
with respect to all those who could reasonably rely upon the representation of their interests
by the named plaintiff. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969) (commencement of class
action halts running of statute of limitations against all class members); Malcom v. Cities Serv.
Co., 2 F.R.D. 405 (D. Del. 1942) (suit by one class member relieves others from imputation of
laches); Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 39 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Pa. 1941); but see Monarch
Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975).
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
forced to bring suits against the individual debtors. With respect to
individual suits it is necessary to examine first, what circumstances
would preclude joinder of the several hundred participants in one law-
suit and second, what problems and expenses could be avoided by
bringing a class action rather than several hundred individual suits.
1. Inability to Join
Joinder of claims rules pose the first obstacle because those rules
might prevent suing all Eskaton participants in one action. Despite
the liberality of modem joinder rules, joinder generally requires that the
claims arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences."
Although the claims in Eskaton present common issues of law that
would justify class action treatment, the transactions giving rise to the
claims are wholly separate. 67  Because joinder is not possible, there-
fore, a defendant class suit is the only way to avoid having to bring
several hundred separate actions.
Jurisdiction and venue requirements may pose a second obstacle
to joinder of all participants.68 If some of the hospitals and their
patients in Eskaton had been in California and others had been in
Arizona and Nevada, jurisdictional barriers would have necessitated
at least three separate nonclass suits. Although coordination among
the three sets of counsel would be possible, considerable extra ex-
pense would result.
At least in federal question class actions brought in federal
courts, plaintiff may be able to bind personally defendants that have
no contact with the forum.69 In federal diversity actions, plaintiff
66. See, e.g., County Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 146 F. Supp. 933
(E.D. Pa. 1956), in which joinder of defendants was held improper under FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a);
Kevin v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 9 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 20a.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
67. Inability to join is perhaps more clear when there is no common link like the health
maintenance organization to connect the class members' activities. Assume, for example, that
a large number of land developers or lending institutions are allegcd to have failed in the same
way to make disclosures required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C, §§ 77a-77aa (1970); or
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970); or the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970); or the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3500.1-.14 (Supp. V., 1975). The same would be true of a suit against a
multitude of gasoline service stations for having violated a state consumer fraud law by
failing to post prices for premium gasoline or for failing to note that posted prices do not include
sales tax.
68. For an example of an instance in which a defendant class action was brought partly
for this reason, see Thompson v. Board of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398, 411-12 (W.D. Mich. 1976),
69. Just as Congress can authorize nationwide service of process in federal court actions,
Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925), there s little doubt that Congress
constitutionally could provide that judgments rendered in federal court class actions would
bind absentees whether the absentees had any contact with the state in which the federal
court was held and regardless of the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. The question Is
whether Congress, by confining the territorial limits of the federal district courts and by pass-
ing the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), has narrowed the applicable forum for
federal class actions. The Act authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procc-
dure for the federal district courts. The Act specifically directed that such rules not "abridge,
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may also achieve subject matter jurisdiction over defendants that are
his co-citizens by naming only members of the defendant class whose
citizenships are diverse.70 Plaintiff may avoid venue problems by
naming only class members to whom venue is satisfied.' Furthermore,
even though joinder in one suit may be permitted, it might not be
feasible. As noted earlier, the hospitals would be unable to serve
many of the participants because their location or identity were un-
known. The class action will preserve claims against these participants
from statute of limitations defenses until they can be found.
enlarge or modify any substantive right." This proscription is also contained in FED. R. Cry.
P. 82.
If rule 23 were construed to allow federal courts in diversity cases to apply the law of the
state in which the court is located to absentees of different citizenship from that of the class
representatives, rule 23 would violate the Act's prohibition when the only courts in which the
absentees could be bound in either individual federal court actions or state class actions
would apply the law of another state. For example: A plaintiff is aggrieved by actions of
numerous defendants, some of whom are domiciled in North Dakota and some of whom are
domiciled in South Dakota. The South Dakota defendants have no contacts with North Da-
kota, and the conflict of laws principles of South Dakota require that state courts apply the
internal law of South Dakota to the controversy between the plaintiff and its domiciliaries.
If rule 23 enabled the plaintiff in a defendant class action brought in North Dakota federal
court to have North Dakota's internal law applied to the South Dakota defendants, the rule
would change the rules of decision by which the litigants' rights will be adjudicated and hence
contravene the Act's prohibition against affecting substantive rights. See Mississippi Pub-
lishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946), upholding federal rule 4(f) (process "may
be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is
held") on the basis that the rule "does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules
of decision" by which the federal district court adjudicates the litigants' rights.
Forum shopping would be encouraged by allowing the federal courts to apply a different
law from the law that would be applied in the state court. If the decisional scope of the
federal courts is suffered to be broader than that of the states in which the federal district
courts sit, the federal courts exceed the roles assigned them. In all matters except those in which
the need for national uniformity was perceived, the citizens of each state were to be governed
by the different laws of their states, those laws varying according to the different needs and atti-
tudes of the respective states' citizens. Allowing the citizens of one state to be governed by the
laws of another where those citizens have done nothing to warrant application of another state's
laws conflicts with this scheme and also frustrates the citizens' expectations.
When plaintiff seeks to enforce claims arising under federal law, however, there is less
reason for limiting the territorial reaches of judgment. The law to be applied is the same re-
gardless whether the absentees reside in the state in which the federal court is held. Consid-
erations of forum shopping and concern over conduct of one state's citizens being governed by
another state's laws do not apply. Nor, for the same reason, does the Rules Enabling Act's
prohibition as interpreted in Mississippi Publishing present any problem.
On the other hand, nationwide scope for the federal courts' jurisdiction is at odds with
basic notions underlying the doctrine of forum non conveniens and rules of venue. Absentees
may be prejudiced unfairly by not being able to intervene in a class action conducted in a distant
federal court, particularly when exclusion is not permitted. Expansion of the court's jurisdic-
tion also might result in inefficient allocation of cases among the federal courts.
70. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). This assumes, of course,
that the jurisdictional amount requirement is satisfied with respect to each defendant. See
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1931). See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R. Fed.
18 (1969); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 602 (1953).
71. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1757 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Cf. Brown v. Bache, 66 App. Div. 367, 72 N.Y.S. 687
(1901) (unnamed plaintiff in a class action cannot be regarded as a party on a motion for change
of venue within the provision of a statute requiring that an action be commenced in the county
where either the plaintiff or defendants reside).
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2. Class Action versus Numerous
Individual Suits
The most significant advantage of defendant class actions is that
they allow plaintiffs to enforce claims against a number of defendants
when the size of the individual claims or the complexity of the issues
makes numerous individual suits economically infeasible.
The hospitals can obviously not afford to litigate a complex liability
question when a participant's bill amounts to ten dollars. Hence, the
discovery and trial costs and the legal fees necessary to litigate several
hundred claims of this nature would be prohibitive.
In a class action against representative participants, depositions
would be conducted and motions submitted only once on the issue
whether participants of a health care maintenance organization can
be liable to health care providers when the organization fails. If the
hospitals prevail, they will have reduced some of the cost of service
of process and deferred paying the rest until assured of recovering
the cost. If the hospitals lose, they will have lost-in addition to their
claim-the legal fees and costs of a single lawsuit rather than several
hundred.
The economic burden of numerous individual suits is not the only
circumstance that makes the defendant class action attractive. The
recently liberalized attitude of courts in binding litigants without re-
quiring mutuality of estoppel72 has created an additional incentive
Defendant class actions in which federal jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citi-
zenship present no difficulty. Absent special statutory provisions, venue is proper where either
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970). The need to circumvent
venue requirements through strategic selection of class representatives arises in suits founded
upon general federal question jurisdiction, where venue is proper only in the district where all
defendants reside or where the claim arose. 28 US.C. § 1391(b) (1970), The same problem
occurs in actions brought under various federal statutes that incorporate special venue provisions,
Suits for patent infringement, for example, must be brought in the district where all defen-
dants reside, or where all defendants have committed acts of irfringement and have regular
places of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1970) ("in the judicial district where the defendant re-
sides"); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957) (patent venue
statute is exclusive and must be satisfied with respect to all defendants). Most federal courts
that have allowed patent infringement suits against defendant classes have held that venue ap-
plies only to the representative defendants. Dale Elecs., Inc. v. I .C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R,D,
531, 538 (D.N.H. 1971), order rescinded on other grounds, 178 U.S.P.Q. 525 (D.N.H. 1973). Re-
search Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 591 (ND. 11. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); Bourns, Inc. v. Allen Bradley Co,, 173 U.S.P.Q, 567,
569 (N.D. I11. 1971), dismissed on other grounds, 348 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. 111. 1972), Inodicied, 480
F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1973). Contra, Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Dtuta Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552
(E.D. Va. 1972).
One court has suggested that a class action might be appropiate to overcome jurisdiction
and venue problems when three persons claimed rights to certain insurance policies. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America v. Trowbridge, 313 F. Supp. 428, 429 n.l (D. Conn. 1970).
In Weit v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., Civil No. 70 C 1926 (N.D. IIl,
1970), one reason for using the defendant class action device was to circumvent the venue re-
quirements of 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970), limiting venue in actions against national banking associ-
ations.
72. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd.. 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.). cert.
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for utilizing defendant class actions. If the hospitals in Eskaton chose
individual suits and lost any one suit they could be collaterally estopped
from relitigating the common issues in subsequent suits. This risk of
being barred from recovering all the claims as a result of one adverse
adjudication is an incentive for using defendant class actions.
If the hospitals sue ten participants individually and win each
time, they still must relitigate the liability issue in subsequent suits.
A defendant who was not a party to the original action or the original
defendant's privy cannot for due process reasons be bound. 3 If the
hospitals lose the eleventh suit, however, they could be precluded from
asserting the participants' liabilities in subsequent suits. Principles
of estoppel may have different application depending on whether the
party asserting it was originally a plaintiff or defendant. Some courts
have tended to apply collateral estoppel more readily when, as in the
hospitals' case, the party asserting collateral estoppel uses the doctrine
as a shield rather than as a sword.74 The hospitals could avoid these
dangers only by suing all members in one lawsuit. In view of the diffi-
culties inherent in one nonclass suit, the defendant class action is an
attractive alternative.
Individual, nonrelated plaintiffs are also not bound by an adverse
decree against any one of them. Thus, the defendant class action
permits a prospective defendant to avoid being subject to incompatible
decrees from multiple determinations in suits brought or threatened
by numerous potential plaintiffs. A prospective defendant can avoid
this problem by suing the class for a declaration of right or of non-
liability.75
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. Compania Mexicana v. Jernigan. 410 F.2d
718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892, (1942); Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 277 Mass. 563, 179 N.E. 246 (1932). See gen-
erally Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV.
281 (1957).
73. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Goodnow's Adm'r, 123 U.S. 549 (1887); Burton v. Hazzard, 4
Del. 100 (4 Harr. 1844); Fletcher v. Perry, 104 Vt. 229, 158 A. 679 (1932).
74. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Elder v. N.Y. & Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y.
350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940); Johnson v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 44 Misc. 2d 138, 253
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1964), in which the courts refused to allow affirmative use of collateral estoppel.
Other courts, however, have allowed collateral estoppel to be used as a sword. See, e.g.
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). No doubt,
the application of collateral estoppel should depend upon balancing a number of factors-
opportunity of the party to be bound to litigate the concluded issue earlier, the foreseability
of subsequent litigation, whether the court in the initial decision was a court of limited
competence, the relative amounts at stake in the two proceedings. The use of collateral
estoppel as a sword or a shield is only one criterion.
75. Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of federal rule 23 allows a class action to be maintained -hen:
(1) the prosection of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class . ...
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Separate actions by individuals against a municipality to declare
a bond issue invalid or to condition it; actions to prevent or limit a
proposed appropriation; suits to compel or invalidate an assessment
or dividend declaration-any of these actions might result in the party
opposing the class having a legal obligation both to proceed and at
the same time not to proceed with a particular course of conduct.7t
Directors might be bound by articles of incorporation to declare and
pay a dividend yet be forbidden by court decree from doing so. Like-
wise, individual litigation of the rights and duties of riparian owners
or of landowners' rights and duties respecting a claimed nuisance
could create a possibility of inconsistent adjudications. The potential
defendant can escape this unenviable position by asking the court to
hold all potential plaintiffs necessary parties to any one suit and re-
quire their joinder." As an alternative, or where joinder of all po-
tential litigants is not feasible and the court declines to dismiss,
defendant can protect itself from multiple liability by interpleader and
from inconsistent obligations by class suit.78
In Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson,79 for example, a corporation that
operated a dam had been sued in separate state court suits by riparian
owners below the dam who alleged that interference with the natural
flow of water injured their farms. The corpor.tion filed a defendant
class action to have its dam operating rights determined in one suit."
76. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (plaintiff class
suit by certificate holders to invalidate reorganization of mutual benefit society); Gart v. Cole,
263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff class suit challenging validity of urban renewal project), cert,
denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959); Maricopa County Mun. Water Conervation Dist. v. Looney, 219
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1955) (plaintiff class suit by bondholders to recover from water conservation
district increased interest as specified on bond coupons in face of contention that such pay-
ments were unauthorized); Romick v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 197 F.2d 369 (5th Cir, 1952)
(plaintiff class suit to compel cash and stock dividend); Rank v, Krug, 142 F. Supp. I (S.D,
Cal. 1956) (plaintiff class suit by riparian owners to enjoin the United States from impounding
water at government dam), modified, 293 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1961).
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Part of the language of rule 19(a) closely parallels rule
23(b)(1). That part of rule 19 and rule 23(b)(1) are both designed to avoid prejudicing rights
of those who are not parties to the lawsuit. Both rules were reformulated in 1966 to take these
practical problems into consideration. According to the Advisory Committee's reporter, the
rules' interrelation, to which specific attention was directed in 1966, is "not accidental but
logical." Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1965 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 389 (1967). See also Atlantis Dev. Corp, v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
78. To prevent great prejudice, the class action plaintiff mu,.t be able not only to prevent
individual suits but also to enjoin prosecution of those already brought. The class action plaintiff
will usually be unable to enjoin in federal court suits that have already been commenced in
state court. Federal courts are forbidden from enjoining state court proceedings except as
expressly authorized by federal statute, or when necessary in aid of their jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate their judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Class actions have been held
not to constitute such exceptions. Romick v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 197 F.2d 369 (5th
Cir. 1952); Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1931).
79. 49 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1931).
80. The suit was dismissed for failure to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
See note 70 supra. The court also held that it was precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 from en-
joining the state court actions. See note 78 supra.
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Without the class action, the corporation might have been faced with
an obligation to use certain means of flood control with respect to
some riparian owners but a prohibition from using the same methods
with respect to others.81 Georgia Power is an example of what was
once referred to as a bill of peace, that is, a declaration of a right of
nonliability against a group of prospective plaintiffs. Unlike Eskaton,
defendant class actions brought to avoid inconsistent obligations are
essentially potential plaintiff class actions in which defendant sues first.
A defendant may also be able to make affirmative use of a plaintiff
class action brought against it by pursuing a counterclaim against an
erstwhile plaintiff class.8 2  Defendant class counterclaims will not be
fraught with the problems of adequate representation or exclusion
considered by some to be inherent in defendant class actions be-
cause the defendant is pursuing its claim against an already defined
class. There are numerous advantages to unitary resolution of an
issue common to a multitude of defendants. Class action is the
preferable, and often the only, means of achieving such a resolution.
IV. ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
Adequacy of representation is of vital concern to the plaintiff as
well as the defendant in a defendant class action. Because adequate
representation has been viewed as a substitute for the requirement of
individual notice and opportunity to be heard, 3 the plaintiff's ability
to bind absent defendants is dependent on the selection of adequate
representative defendants.
Adequacy of representation has a double aspect. First, the per-
sons named as parties by the opponent of the class must have interests
similar enough to the interests of absent class members to ensure that
the named parties are truly representative of the class. Second, the
representatives must conduct the litigation in a manner that ensures
full and fair consideration of the common issues.8 4 The first aspect
81. A similar problem would face an alleged trespasser on land held by numerous tenants
in common, some of whom threaten ejeetment actions. Because each tenant is entitled to
possession of the whole, any tenant can by himself bring an action in ejectment. See, e.g.,
Locklear v. Oxendine, 233 N.C. 710, 65 S.E.2d 673 (1951); Madrid v. Borrego, 54 N.M. 276.
221 P.2d 1058 (1950). The tenancy in common situation may differ somewhat from the riparian
owner example because recovery of possession by one tenant is held to inure to the benefit
of his cotenants. Winborne v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., 130 N.C. 32, 40 S.E. 825 (1902);
Hanley v. Stewart, 155 Pa. Super. 535, 39 A.2d 323 (1944).
82. See, e.g., Jones v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dcv., 68 F.R.D. 60 (E.D.
La. 1975); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Defendants
seeking to bring counterclaims must comply with all the usual rule 23 requirements, even if the
counterclaim is compulsory. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
83. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
84. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). This two-pronged inquiry is well established.
See, e.g., Commissioners of Sewers v. Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610 (1876) (m[T1he court being satisfied
that the parties are fairly represented, and the matter fairly contested . . . everyone not present
is bound").
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might be called "character of representation"; the second, "quality of
representation."
Commentators almost uniformly contend that problems of ade-
quacy are more serious in defendant class actions than in plaintiff
class actions.85 Two commentators, for example, noted these diffi-
culties:
First, apparently the selection of representatives is left to the plaintiff.
Second, virtually none of the defendants may have any incentive to en-
dure the expenses of defending a big suit on beha-lf of the entire class
when the expense may be utterly disproportionate to his stake. Third,
there is no easy way of compensating the defendants' counsel for the
benefits conferred upon the class.86
One could add to this list the special problems of adequacy in the
settlement process and the difficulty of assessing adequacy of repre-
sentation.
A. Selection of Representatives
At least with respect to defendant class actions like Eskaton in
which monetary relief is sought, the plaintiffs ultimate purpose is to
use the res judicata effect of a favorable judgment in subsequent suits
brought by or against absent class members. Although plaintiff's
chances of succeeding in the class suit normally will be greatest when
it selects the weakest possible class members to represent the class,
the likelihood of binding absent parties increases as adequacy of
representation is enhanced. Hence, plaintiff can generally be expected
to select the most adequate defendants to maximize the possiblity
that the judgment will be binding.
Because absentees will be bound whether the representatives are
the strongest or just capable enough to be barely adequate, a less pru-
dent plaintiff might select the weakest acceptable defendants. Plain-
tiffs with weak cases might even select wholly inadequate representa-
tives in the hope of benefiting from a favorable judgment, despite the
risk of ultimately gaining nothing after having borne the trouble and
expense of litigation. When monetary relief is sought and collateral
proceedings thus required, plaintiff may gamble that some absentees
will lack resources sufficient to mount an attack on the named defen-
dants' adequacy in subsequent actions, or that financially able absen-
tees will be unaware of the possibility of collaterally attacking ade-
85. See, e.g., Anderson & Roper. Limiting Relitigation by Defendant Class Actions From
Defendant's Viewpoint, 4 J. MAR. J. OF PkAC. AND Paoc. 200 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ander-
son & Roper]; Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. C111, L,
REv. 684 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Kalven & Rosenfield]; Comment, Federal Rule of Civil Pro.
cedure 23-Class Actions in Patent infringement Litigation, 7 CRIIGIITON L. REv. 50 (1973);
Note, Binding Effect of Class Action, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1059 (1954) [hereinafter cited as 1954
Harvard Note].
86. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 85, at 697 n.39.
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quacy of representation. If the ultimate relief sought is declaratory
or injunctive so that plaintiff normally need conduct no litigation be-
yond the class suit, plaintiff may gamble that absent members will not
88bring collateral suits to challenge adequacy.
Although it is theoretically possible that a plaintiff will choose
weak defendant representatives, it is extremely unlikely. Plaintiffs
like the hospitals in Eskaton, for example, are simply unwilling to
spend thousands of dollars for legal fees and costs to risk coming away
with nothing if the court in the middle of the class action proceeding
concludes that the representatives are inadequate; or if just one of the
several hundred participants brings an independent collateral action for
a declaration that because representation was inadequate the entire
proceeding was a nullity; or if several of the participants who each
owe the hospitals ten or twenty thousand dollars do indeed challenge
adequacy of representation when the hospitals bring collateral pro-
ceedings to secure judgments against the participants.
The hospitals' selection of defendant-representatives in Eskaton,
for example, was undoubtedly influenced by the knowledge that
collateral suits would have to be brought against each absent class
member.8 9  In many of the suits-especially those in which the bills
were several thousand dollars-adequacy of representation would be
challenged. Plaintiff is unlikely to risk losing such a challenge by
choosing weak representatives.
The strong incentive to choose adequate representatives in de-
fendant class actions does not exist in plaintiff class actions. To begin
with, the selection process the defendant class action plaintiff can use to
ensure adequacy is not available to the plaintiff representative. The
defendant class action plaintiff can search and investigate until it is
satisfied that adequate defendant representatives exist. Only if there
are none must it face the decision either to select inadequate repre-
sentatives or forego class suit. A prospective plaintiff-representative
that considers itself inadequate, however, faces the decision at once.
Although the plaintiff-representative may be concerned about findings
87. Assuming adequacy is collaterally attacked, there is no assurance that the court %%ill re-
fuse to hold the absent party bound even when the class action court erroneously determined
that representation was adequate. The most obvious though perhaps least likely possibility is
a further erroneous decision in the collateral proceeding followed either by failure to appeal or
appeal with perfunctory affirmance or failure to exercise jurisdiction by an appellate court.
88. Even if absentees were inadequately represented and hence could not constitutionally
be bound by any injunctive decree, absentees would act at their peril by not obeying the
decree. Except when the court's assertion of jurisdiction is frivolous and not substantial, per-
sons enjoined by the court cannot defend contempt charges by asserting the unconstitu-
tionality of the injunction. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181
(1922). Violators of court orders are subject to contempt even though the order is set aside on
appeal, Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. 14 (1887), or even though the underlying action has be-
come moot, Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
89. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
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of inadequacy during the pendency of the class proceeding, he will be
totally unconcerned about collateral proceedings. Unlike the de-
fendant class action plaintiff, the plaintiff-representative runs no risk
of prevailing on a class basis only to lose the benefits of the lengthy
class proceeding through collateral suit. The plaintiff-representative
need bring no collateral suits to enforce a judgment.
Plaintiff class actions contain a disincentive to making the repre-
sentative's interests coincide precisely with the class' interests. Except
for instances in which cost of notice9° is a problem, it is in the in-
terest of the plaintiff-representative's attorney to make the class as
large as possible because an important factor in the attorney's com-
pensation will be the size of the class. 91 For the same reason, the
attorney will be reluctant to suggest subclas,;es 92 even when clear
90. Federal rule 23 (c)(2) requires notice of opportunity to opt out or intervene in actions
under subdivision (b)(3) to all class members: "In any class action maintained under subdi-
vision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the cl, ss the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all member, who can be identified through
reasonable effort." Despite the fact that the rule specifically rquires notice only in actions
under subdivision (b)(3), some authorities have held that due process requires notice in all class
actions. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968); Richmond Black
Police Officers Ass'n v. Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 158 (E.D. Vr. 1974); Lynch v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Brandt v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lopcz v. Wyman,
329 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aftd, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972); Fowles v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a fid, 449 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1971);
Clark v. American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305, 1306 (E.D, La. 1969), But see Hammond
v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (semble); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D, 495, 49)
(E.D. Va. 1975) (dictum); Richerson v. Fargo, 61 F.R.D. 641 (E.D Pa. 1974), vacated, 64 F.RD.
393 (E.D. Pa. 1974); White v. Local 207, Laborer's, 387 F. Supp. 53, 54 (W.D. La. 1974); Ostapo-
wicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465, 466 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (scmble); Johnson v. City of
Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 301 (E.D. La. 1970); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F.
Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), modified, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied. 404 U.S. 951
(1971); 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45[l] (2d ed. 1971); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 71,
at § 1786. The Supreme Court's decision in Eisen did not settle the split of authority, The Court
there held only that rule 23 itself requires individual notice in actions brought under subdivi-
sion (b)(3). Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974),
In view of numerous Supreme Court opinions passing upon various aspects of class actions
without ever, in a non-subdivision (b)(3) class action, discussing notice, it seems unlikely that
notice is required in all cases. It is possible, of course, that the question of notice was simply
never raised in those cases. More significant perhaps are the various English cases decided prior
to the enactment of the Constitution in which notice plainly was not required. See notes 23-31
supra and accompanying text. Those common-law antecedents were likely embodied in the Con-
stitution's notion of due process.
91. The following criteria are the most imlportant factors in determining the plaintiff-repre-
sentative's attorney's fees: the amount of economic benefit conferrcd on the class; the time spent
by the attorney; the skill of the attorney; the complexity of the issues; and the contingent nature
of the recovery. For some cases discussing the various factors, see Arenson v. Board of
Trade, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. I11. 1974); Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp.. 59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D.
Ill. 1972). The most significant criterion is the size of the economic benefit conferred upon the
class as a result of the attorney's work. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co,, 53
F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971) (recovery of $29,875,000; award of $6,111,000); Philadelphia Elec, Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (recovery of S22.175.000; award of
$5,500,000).
92. Federal rule 23 (c)(4) provides that when appropriate, ".an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or . . . a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class . .. ."
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conflicts of interest appear. Because the defendant class action plain-
tiff has a motive for ensuring adequate representation, it does have an
incentive to create subclasses when they are needed.93
Assume that half the franchise agreements for one particular chain
of fast food drive-ins obligate the franchisees to purchase their re-
quirements of meat, buns, soft drinks, and other products from the
franchisor. The other half contain the same obligation but provide
for waiver of the requirement if the franchisees can demonstrate to
the franchisor's reasonable satisfaction that products obtainable else-
where are of top quality. Several of the franchisees in each of the
two groups violate the requirements clause, and the franchisor ter-
minates their franchises.
There are at least three groups with conflicting interests. The
terminated franchisees would be best served by suing for damages
regardless of the harm resulting to the franchise operation. The
existing franchisees with bare requirements provisions might prefer
only injunctive or declaratory relief against the probable antitrust
violation 94 because they would be concerned with the impact of a
damage suit on the franchise operation and because their damages,
if any, would be far smaller than damages of franchisees who had lost
their businesses. Existing franchisees whose contracts contained
waiver provisions might be best served by leaving the agreement
intact because the requirements clause could benefit the franchise
operation by providing quality control.
Nevertheless, because the plaintiff's counsel will probably receive
a larger fee if the class is larger, he has an incentive to include all
three groups in the class. If a lawyer were retained by a terminated
franchisee to bring a plaintiff class action against the franchisor, the
lawyer might include existing franchisees in the class even though
the class would then contain groups with clearly conflicting inter-
ests.95
93. There is one disincentive to creating subclasses in both defendant and plaintiff class
actions-the added trouble and expense subclasses would entail.
94. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) makes it unlawful to lease or sell goods in inter-
state commerce on the condition that the lessee or purchaser not use or deal in goods of a com-
petitor of the lessor or seller where the effect of the lease or sale may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in a line of commerce. The best known example
of an illegal tying arrangement in the franchise area is Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). See generally' Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 473
(1973).
95. Terminated retailers and franchisees are generally denied representative status.
See, e.g., McMackin Hardware Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., [1974-1] CCH Trade Cas. 75,047
(N.D. 11. 1973); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo. 55 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Gaines v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. of America, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 60 (N.D. Ill. 1972). B/t
see Kramer v. Gold Medal Bakeries, [1973-1] CCH Trade Cas. 1 74,543 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Seligson
v. Plum Tree, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
The McMackin court, while denying representative status when it perceived antagonism
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If the franchisor wished to bring a defendant class action against
the franchisees to recover lost profits from breach of the require-
ments clause, however, the franchisor would not be tempted to
squeeze all franchisees into one class. The added cost of bringing
two class actions rather than one would be small compared to the
risks the franchisor would run if representation were found inade-
quate because the representatives' interests were inconsistent with
the interests of some absentees. The franchisor would certainly either
file more than one defendant class action or create subclasses within a
single class suit, each subclass containing its own representatives.
The plaintiff in a defendant class action initially selects the repre-
sentatives,96 but the court may rule that the action can be maintained
only if representation is improved through intervention by additional
parties of a stated type.97 Thus, one way to allay the concern of those
who doubt the eagerness of plaintiffs to select adequate defendant
representatives is to have the court originally select the represen-
tatives. 9" Plaintiff would submit a list of all known defendants. The
court, or plaintiff under the court's direction, could send defendants
questionnaires concerning their stakes in the lawsuit, their financial
resources, and so forth. Defendants that declined to answer would
not be allowed to complain later of inadequacy.
B. Motive to Press or Defend Claims and Protect Class
The representatives in a defendant class action may be forced
individually to sustain a heavy financial burden but at the same time
share any resulting benefits with the members of the class. This,
of course, is not very appealing to a prospective representative.
Simply because none of the defendant class members may have any
desire99 to endure the expenses of defending a big suit on behalf of
the entire class, however, it does not follow that none of them has any
motive to do so. The rationale for allowing the few to represent the
between interests of existing and terminated franchisees, suggested a middle ground. If the
franchise had been terminated and other present franchisees were threatened with similar ac.
tion, the chance of conflict would be much less and the terminated franchisee could represent
all franchisees.
96. "No doubt the plaintiff must have the right of selecting the defendants," Commiq-
sioners of Sewers v. Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610 (1876).
97. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966).
98. In Conover v. Packanack Lake Country Club and Community Ass'n, 94 N.J. Super,
275, 228 A.2d 78 (1967), the court appears to have selected the representatives,
99. It has been suggested that desire to defend should be an important consideration
when the class is the defendant. Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Improper Method
of Litigating Patents?, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474, 483 [hereinafter cited as Illinois Note]. Tile
courts, however, have properly recognized that desire to defend should at most be a small flac-
tor in determining quality of representation at the outset of the litigation. For instance, the
court in Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. IIl, 1969),
appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970), gave only token consideration to the represen-
tatives' explicit denial of desire to represent the class. The cour,: found that the representa-
tives' ability and intention to defend outweighed this desire. Accord, Thompson v. Board of
Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398, 407 n.13 (W.D. Mich. 1976); Hopson v. Schilling. 418 F. Supp, 1223, 1237
(N.D. Ind. 1976).
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many is grounded not on any supposed concern the representatives
have for the interests of other class members, but upon the represen-
tatives' self-interests. °0  If the interests of the representatives sub-
stantially coincide with the interests of absent class members, the
representatives automatically protect the others to the limit of their
ability by advancing their own interests. 01
Even if the interests of the representatives in a plaintiff class
action are by chance identical with the absentees' interests, the ra-
tionale that self-interested representatives automatically advance the
class cause does not generally apply in a plaintiff class action.
The plaintiff class action is more a lawyer's potentially well-paid vindi-
cation of semi-public rights than an action in which one person
presses his claim or defense and incidentally represents others similar-
ly situated. It is the lure of winning rather than the duty of effec-
tive representation that fuels the plaintiff class action and its lawyer-
champion; however, winning is not always synonymous with effective
representation.
Assume that an industrial water user is unlawfully diverting
stream water for its use to the injury of riparian farmers downstream.
The plaintiff representative's attorney might be tempted to seek dam-
ages for the farmers even though they would be better served by in-
juctive relief. Although courts have awarded fees to the plaintiff
representative's counsel when nonmonetary relief was secured,' 02 the
lawyer is more likely to be compensated or at least be better com-
pensated if damages are obtained for the class.
Another illustration of the conflict between plaintiff class action
representatives and their counsel is a state that suspends without
hearing drivers licenses after conviction for certain traffic offenses.
The court in a plaintiff class action in which the class includes all
drivers who have had their licenses suspended, holds that the practice
denies due process but declares that its ruling is prospective only.
Although the suspension is not removed from the records of those who
have already had their licenses suspended without hearing, their at-
torney has prevailed, and he is compensated.0 3
Just as the lure of large fees is not necessarily an effective sub-
stitute for identity of interests, neither is it always an adequate re-
100. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. IBS, 237 U.S. 662, 672 (1915); Aalco Laundry & Cleaning
Co. v. Laundry Linen & Towel Local 366, 115 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Mo. App. 1938); Weale v. West-
Middlesex Waterworks, 37 Eng. Rep. 412 (Ch. 1820). See generally 1954 Harvard Note, supra
note 85, at 1059. Regardless whether the defense is vigorous or otherwise adequate, the named
members will be bound by any judgment because they are sued in their individual as w'ell as
representative capacities. See REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 116, comment b (1941).
101. Webster v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 50 F. Supp. 11. 15 (S.D. Cal. 1943);
Los Angeles County v. Winans, 13 CaL App. 234, 109 P. 640 (1910).
102. See note II1 infra and accompanying text.
103. Gonzalez v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). See note 130 infra.
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placement for the watchful eye of the class representative. Apart from
the courts' scrutiny and the intervention of absentees, there is little
check on the way the plaintiff-representative's attorney conducts the
case. Although the plaintiff-representative is in a position to monitor
the litigation, he has little power over the lawyer because the plaintiff-
representative does not pay the lawyer's fee. Furthermore, the class'
lawyer may feel justified in disregarding the representative's wishes
because the attorney's ethical obligation in the event of conflict is to
the class as a whole rather than to the representative. Because little
contact occurs or is even permitted between absent class members and
the lawyer for the class, 10 4 the primary ethical obligation is owed to a
group with which the lawyer has little or no contact. Hence, the
plaintiff-representative's attorney is in a practical sense beholden
neither to the representative who hires him nor to the class.
The defendant class action provides more protection for the repre-
sentative class than a plaintiff class action. Because the defendant-
representative pays his lawyer's fee, the attorney will likely feel re-
sponsible to the representative and seek primarily to advance the
representative's interests. With the identity of interests that is more
assured in defendant class actions than plaintiff class actions, absent
members of the class will be protected.
Assume that the five representatives selected by the hospitals in
Eskaton have bills in excess of ten thousand dollars and that individ-
ually or collectively the representatives have the financial ability to
pay the legal fees necessary to defend the case. Because it is in the
interest of all participants to establish that members of a health main-
tenance organization are not personally liable for obligations of the or-
ganization, it benefits all participants when the representatives' law-
yers urge this defense. In fact, debtors with small bills or limited
financial resources will obtain far better legal representation in the
class suit than they could have secured if they were sued individually
in separate suits.
C. Compensating Counsel for Benefits Conferred
Upon the Class
The time and expense plaintiff saves by bringing a defendant
class action is realized partly at the expense of the defendant-rep-
resentatives because the greater procedural and substantive complex-
ity of the class suit creates added legal fees for the named parties.
The representatives must be both willing and able to pay substantial
legal fees if they are to be considered adequate. Continuity of inter-
104. The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41 (West 1977) suggests that formal
parties be forbidden, absent court approval, from communicating with actual or potential class
members who are not formal parties.
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est will protect absent members only when the representatives have
enough at stake to make them want to defend vigorously as well as
sufficient resources to ensure a capable defense.
The problem of adequate representation is not serious. The
court must simply make sure plaintiff has named either a sufficiently
large number of defendant-representatives or at least one0 s wealthy
defendant, in either case insuring substantial stakes in the outcome of
the suit. Financial ability of the representatives and their stakes in the
suit are matters the court can readily assess. The court must consider
factors like the financial resources of the representatives, the extent
of their possible liability, the sophistication of the representatives,
and the ability of their counsel.' °6 There are some instances, how-
ever, in which financial considerations simply will not permit defen-
dant class actions. Aside from the oft-breached ethical consideration
that prevents the class attorney from bearing ultimate responsibility
for costs, 0 7 a class suit on behalf of five hundred plaintiffs none of
whom have been wronged by more than one hundred dollars is feas-
ible. A class suit against five hundred similar defendants is probably
not.
The arithmetic involved in determining representatives' adequacy
is fairly simple and can be illustrated by returning to the situation in
Eskaton. The hospitals should first estimate the total expense of de-
fending the class suit-assume ten thousand dollars. Unless defen-
dants successfully solicit contributions from the class, a defendant or
105. One representative may be sufficient. See Illinois Note, supra note 99, at 484,
This is clear at least under the federal rules. The April 1937 draft of rule 23 read, "such of
them as will fairly insure . . . adequate representation." In final form, the rule read, "such of
them one or more, as will fairly insure . . adequate representation." (emphasis added).
Moore & Cohen, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 IL± L. REv. 555
(1938). The present federal rule retains the "one or more" language. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a).
The clarification was perhaps occasioned by a reading of early English cases that appeared at
least superficially to concentrate on the number of named parties. See Meux v. Maltby, 36 Eng.
Rep. 621 (Ch. 1818) ("It is quite clear that the present suit has sufficient parties and that the
Defendants may be considered as representing the company."); Adair v. New River Co., 32
Eng. Rep. 1153, 1159 (Ch. 1805). But see Pickering v. llfracombe Ry., 15 LT.R. (n.s.) 461
(V.C. 1867) (two out of 64 sufficient); Hoole v. Great Western Ry., 17 L.T.R. (ns.) 193 (Ch. 1867)
(one representative sufficient). See also Revised Rules of Equity rule 48, quoted in 2 W. RosE,
CODE OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 1796 (1907) (emphasis added): "Where the parties on either side
are very numerous . . . the court. . . may proceed in the suit, having suficient parties before
it to represent all the adverse interests . . . '
106. The test used by the court in Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec.,
285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968), was whether the "parties defendant possess the means,
skill and integrity to protect fairly and adequately the interests of the class." Id. at 721. The
courts generally exercise broad discretion in scrutinizing defendants' adequacy. See, e.g., Gib-
son v. Local 40, Supercargoes & Checkers of the Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union, 543 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976); Cobb v. Avon Prods., Inc., 71 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Thompson v. T.F.I. Co., 64 F.R.D. 140, 148 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
107. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIttLrY, DR 5-103(B) (1977) states:
"While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a laAyer
shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may
advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation . . . provided the client remains ultimately
liable for such expenses."
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oup of defendants will not bother to defend the suit unless potential
liability significantly exceeds total expense of defending the suit.
Assuming no solicitation of absentees, therefore, it will be necessary
to find defendants that have an aggregate potential liability above ten
thousand dollars (probably about fifteen thousand dollars) and that
also have at least ten thousand dollars to spend. There may be a
certain unfairness in requiring the representatives to bear the entire
burden of defending class interests.10 8 The representatives may suc-
ceed, however, in getting some of the unnamed defendants to bear a
portion of the expenses, particularly when plaintiff seeks monetary
relief, because defendants facing liability will probably be more con-
cerned with adequate representation than absentee plaintiffs that are
informed they may be beneficiaries of a class recovery.
One option the courts should consider is requiring plaintiff to
pay court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the defen-
dant-representatives regardless of the suit's outcome. 10 9 The expense
seems a fair price for allowing plaintiff to bring a class suit. Further-
more, problems of the representatives' financial abilities to mount an
adequate defense would be largely eliminated. A more equitable
arrangement would be to place the initial burden of costs and at-
torneys' fees on the plaintiff and later shift all or part of the burden
to absent defendants. Because absentees will be able to assert their
108. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility apparently condones solicitation of
absent class members by the representative but not by the attorney:
A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel
or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice, except
that . . . (5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of hi!; client in litigation in the
nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of othiers, a lawyer may accept,
but shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their
joinder.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-104 (1977). But see ABA OriNioN
111 (1934). At least with respect to defendant class actions, there would seem to be no ethi-
cal problems with solicitation. As an English chancery court pointed out in one defendant
class action, Brown v. Howard, 21 Eng. Rep. 960 (Ch. 1701): "(Ilt is no Maintenance for all the
Tenants to contribute, for it is the Case of all . . ." Prohibitions against communicating with
class members are probably designed to avoid barratry, which has been defined as "the offense
of frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels between his majesty's subjects," 4 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *133. Because it is plaintiff that has stirred up the litigation and not
the defendant representative, the rationale of forbidding solicitation appears not to apply to dc-
feridant class actions, at least absent collusion between the plaintiff and the representative.
To the extent that such solicitation is made on a mass basis, court supervision should be
required. As the Manual for Complex Litigation notes: "[T]o the party solicited, solicitation may
appear to be an authorized activity approved by the court." MANUAL FOR COMPLrx LiTIOA-
TION § 1.41 (West 1977). In the plaintiff class action there is little chance that excessive fee
contracts will be solicited because all fees are awarded by the cot rt on a more or less quantum
meruit basis; however, defendant class actions do present such occasion.
109. The rule is well established in plaintiff class actions that only named plaintiffs are
liable for costs. See, e.g., Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D, Iowa 1972)
(semble); Scott v. Pascall and Adams, 60 Eng. Rep. 736 (V.C. 1847); Note, Recurrent Problemns
in Action Brought on Behalf of a Class, 34 COLUm. L. REV. 118 (1934). The reasons given in
the cases, however, seem in general only to apply to plaintiff class actions. But see Price v.
Rhondda Urban School Dist. Council, [1923] All E.R. 679, 680 (Ch.), in which the court spoke
of lack of jurisdiction as the reason. The Court of King's Berch, for example, gave as the
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
own separate defenses against the plaintiff's class declaration,"0 ex-
pense shifting is feasible only when collateral proceedings are contem-
plated by the plaintiff, as when monetary relief is sought.
Assume there are five hundred participants in a health mainten-
ance organization. Ten have hospital bills over ten thousand dollars,
and five of those participants are named representatives. Assume fur-
ther that the issues involved are, as they will be in most defendant
class proceedings, issues of law, that can be decided by summary
judgment. The cost of defense is nine thousand dollars. The hospitals
prevail. Recoverable costs amount to one thousand dollars.
Under the first suggestion-requiring the plaintiffs to bear costs
and fees-the hospitals would bear that portion of the thousand dollars
they previously paid and reimburse the representative for whatever
deposition costs and the like that defendants had already paid. The
hospitals would pay the representatives' lawyer nine thousand dollars,
provided the court finds the fee reasonable. The court might be
given discretion to require the representatives to pay costs but not
fees or costs and a percentage of the legal fees.
Under the second suggestion-shifting the ultimate burden-the
hospitals would initially bear the entire ten thousand dollar expense.
When the hospitals then use the favorable class declaration in sub-
sequent suits against the five hundred class members, a recoverable
cost of each of those suits would be twenty dollars, that is, ten thou-
sand dollars divided by five hundred. The expense may also be allo-
cated in proportion to the estimated liability of each class member.
Thus, the costs allocated to a one hundred dollar claim would be three
dollars and the costs allocated to a one thousand dollar claim, thirty
dollars. Alternatively, plaintiff might be permitted to shift only half
the burden. Although each of these suggestions may eliminate the
need to name wealthy defendant-representatives, plaintiff should still
be required to name defendants with substantial potential liability and
some ability to respond to damages. Otherwise, the representatives
might not feel compelled to monitor the litigation, and the class attor-
ney would be as much on his own as an attorney in the plaintiff class
suit.
In plaintiff class actions compensation of class counsel normally
presents little problem. There is a fund from which the attorney can
be compensated. Even when nonmonetary relief is sought, defendant
will often be made to compensate the attorney's successful efforts.'
reason for the rule in plaintiff actions: "In representative actions . . . [t]he plaintiff is the
self-elected representative of the others. He has not to obtain their consent. . . . [C]onsc-
quently they are not liable for costs . . . :" Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2
K.B. 1021, 1039. See also Scott v. Pascall and Adams, 60 Eng. Rep. 736 (V.C. 1847).
110. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
111. This is not universally the rule. For instance, the creation of a fund out of %hich
fees can be paid is often considered a prerequisite to award of attorney' fees mhen class suit
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The mere prospect of large fees, however, does not ensure financial
ability to advance the class' cause vigorously. The lawyer generally
receives no compensation until litigation is concluded; u2 he is not paid
at all unless he wins. In the meantime, he may be tempted or ob-
liged to minimize his efforts.
This danger is well illustrated by a federal district court plaintiff
class action, Herman v. Doug Frank Development Corp,"3 Real
estate syndicators were sued under the federal securities laws for al-
legedly making false statements in prospectuses and misappropriating
over two million dollars of investors' money. In addition to the syndi-
cators, the accountants involved in preparing the prospectus and other
secondary defendants were also sued. The plaintiffs and syndicators
proposed a settlement. The syndicators would pay eight thousand
dollars to defray the plaintiffs' costs and would assist the plaintiffs
in developing their case against the other defendants. The court ap-
proved the settlement on the strength of plaintiff-representatives'
claims that settlement was proposed because the syndicators were un-
able to satisfy a larger judgment. Although it Ts possible that plain-
tiffs' contention in urging approval of the settlement was made in
good faith, it is also possible that plaintiffs' attorneys were financially
unable or unwilling to continue advancing costs.
D. Settlement
Defendant class actions are not likely to be compromised as fre-
quently as plaintiff actions in which fear of enormous judgments often
pressures defendants to settle.' 4  Unlike plaintiff class actions, the
is brought against a governmental body for the recovery of public funds. See Doran v. Cullter.
ton, 51 Ill. 2d 553, 283 N.E.2d 865 (1972); Rosemont Bldg. Supply. Inc, v. Illinois Highway
Trust Auth., 51 111. 2d 126, 281 N.E.2d 338 (1972); Hoffman v. Lehnhausen, 48 Ill, 2d 323, 269
N.E.2d 465 (1971). Traditionally, courts have awarded fees when parties have through litiga-
tion created, protected, or enhanced a fund, thereby benefiting those with interests in the
fund, the theory being that the expense of such litigation ought to be shared by all benefited.
See generally Hornstein, Legal Theraputics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awardb, 6Q
HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956). The federal courts have required the defendants in plaintifl cleas
actions to pay attorneys' fees even when there was no fund within the control of the court but
when the action had a beneficial effect upon a broad class of persons. See, e.g., Mills v.
Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (dissolution of merger because of misleading
proxy statements sought as ultimate relief). On the theory that the plaintiff class counsel
was acting as a "private attorney general" who would be encouraged to advance the public
interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the court, federal courts have awarded at-
torneys' fees when only injunctive relief was sought. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390
U.S. 400 (1968); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir, 1974); Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp, 703 (M.D, Ala,
1972).
112. But cf Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 3E.9-97 (1970) ("The fact that
this suit has not yet produced, and may never produce, a monetary recovery from which the
fees could be paid does not preclude an award [of attorney's fees] ....
113. Civil No. 74-803 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 1974).
114. This conflict is possible in plaintiff class actions even though class counsel is not
paid by the representative. For an example, see Gonzales v. Ca!,sidy. 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir,
1973), discussed in note 130 infra.
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likelihood of conflict between interests of the class and the class
counsel in defendant class action settlements is slight. Because the
attorney is paid by the named defendants rather than the class' op-
ponent, the greatest potential conflict in defendant class action settle-
ment negotiations occurs between the representatives and the class.115
Assuming again that the representative has interests identical to
those of absentees, the conflict can only manifest itself by some spe-
cial advantage the representative gets from settlement. Any special
treatment should be apparent to the court in the initial suit"16 or in
any collateral proceedings in which the class action judgment is sought
to be enforced or attacked. 1 7  Because special advantage accorded the
representative, if discovered, would dictate a finding that the class was
inadequately represented,'18 plaintiff may eschew such a settlement.
The possibility of collusion between plaintiff and the named
representative certainly exists, but to no greater extent than the
possibility in plaintiff class actions of sub rosa payments to class coun-
sel in return for acquiescence in an unfair settlement. When the
amount of the plaintiff-representatives counsel fee is negotiated as
part of an overall settlement 9 subject to court approval, 20 the
potential for conflict between the interests of the class and the in-
terests of its counsel is great.
It has been suggested by a commentator, concerned with pro-
tecting absentees in compromised defendant class actions, that any
class member that does not wish to settle on the basis proposed be
allowed to take over the defense as a representative party.12 1 This,
however, would enable a stubborn defendant to deprive the entire class
of a beneficial compromise. It has also been suggested that settle-
ment be made binding only on the named defendants.12 2  Absentees
could then take advantage of the proposed settlement if they con-
115. Any settlement must be approved by the trial court. See note 120 infra.
116. For an example of a case in which the court in collateral proceedings found such an
advantage to exist, see Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed in note 130
infra.
117. See id.
118. See, e.g.,id.
119. See, e.g., Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
120. "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of
the class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Notice might be re-
quired even when there has never been a judicial determination that the case is a proper class
action and even though the plaintiff is willing to strike class action allegations in the com-
plaint. See Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Anaconda Arm. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967). The theory is that the
representative has used the class allegations as leverage to obtain a more favorable settlement
and that this benefit more properly belongs to the class.
121. Anderson & Roper, supra note 85, at 210.
122. Anderson & Roper, supra note 85, at 209-10.
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sidered it beneficial. This latter suggestion would in most cases de-
prive the defendant class action of its effectiveness. This suggestion,
like the first, would tend to prevent compromise. Plaintiffs would
not want to risk being unable to bind absentee.. The overwhelming
majority of suits filed-whether class or individual-are settled. Placing
serious obstacles in the path of settlement would foster an inefficiency
in the judicial system that would outweigh the benefits of these sug-
gested settlement procedures.
E. Who Questions Adequacy?
Another potential problem in ensuring adequate representation
in defendant class actions is the difficulty of assessing adequacy. In
the plaintiff class action, there is a natural opponent to question ade-
quacy. To the extent defendant believes absent plaintiffs will not sue
on their own, defendant will attempt to have the class action dismissed
by arguing that representation is inadequate; to the extent defendant
either believes it will prevail, or contemplates defeat and plans to
settle, it may want to ensure adequacy so that absent plaintiffs will
be bound. Defendant-representatives may have no incentive to deny
the similarity of their interests with absent defendants' interests
when liability is several, at least when the named parties believe
plaintiff would prosecute individual actions if class status were denied.
The named parties may wish to obtain contribution from absent
members and pooling from named members for litigation expenses.
For the same reason, defendant-representatives have no motive to
argue that plaintiff has not sufficiently restricted the class.
On the other hand, defendant in a plaintiff class action does not
have an interest in questioning adequacy in all suits or at all stages
of litigation. When defendant believes quality of representation is
inadequate or when defendant anticipates a multiplicity of individual
suits if the class action is dismissed, it may choose to proceed to a
decision on the merits. 123  When a lump-sum settlement figure has
been reached, defendant may attempt to fix the class as broadly as
possible without considering character of representation in order to
obtain the broadest possible res judicata effect.' 24  Hence, in both
plaintiff and defendant class actions, but especially in the latter, the
court may be the only participant to question adequacy. Because
the court is designed to act as an impartial referee in adversary con-
123. As in the defendant class action situation, the class opponent must weigh the
possibility of gaining advantage in this way against the possibilty of having adequacy col-
laterally attacked after the expense and effort of class litigation has been borne.
124. To the extent, however, that defendant believes the judge will award the class
attorney larger fees when the class is larger, defendant has a motive to press for a smaller
class. Of course, when the settlement provides for a fixed amount per claimant rather than a
lump sum to be divided among the class, the considerations are different,
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tests, it may be ill-suited to champion the absentees' cause, however
fitting it may be for the court to intervene.
Even when adequacy is actively contested by the class oppo-
nent,125 it will often be inaccurately assessed in the class proceeding.
With respect to quality of representation, assessment is likely to be
flawed because the court does not choose to conduct or entertain a
vigorous inquiry; when character of representation is concerned,
incorrect evaluation is likely because making the assessment is
difficult.
Although many guidelines for quality of representation have
emerged, 26 at least in plaintiff class actions the guidelines are rarely
invoked to deny class status 27 unless there is obvious inadequacy,
as when the class representative acts as his own lawyer. 28 In
plaintiff class actions, this judicial laxity is attributable in part to the
courts' awareness that in many cases the rights of absent plaintiffs
would never have been asserted had it not been for the institution of
class suit. A zealous inquiry into adequacy of representation might
simply cause absentees' interests to vanish in practical effect rather
125. Plaintiff has the burden of convincing the court that named representatives of a
defendant class satisfy adequacy requirements. Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs,
410 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ala. 1976). Plaintiff also has this burden in plaintiff class actions, See.
e.g., Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 70 F.R.D. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Gates v. Dalton. 67
F.R.D. 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
126. The criteria most frequently applied are the probability of vigorous prosecution or
defense, see, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968). Cannon %.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Doglow v. Anderson. 43 F.RD. 472
495-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); and the competence of counsel, see, e.g., Fogel v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D.
213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Weisman v. MCA Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 262 (D. Del. 1968): Minnesota %.
United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 567-68 (D. Minn. 1968). With respect to competence
of counsel, the courts have looked at the quality of the pleadings, briefs, and arguments pre-
sented to the court, Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747, 751 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967): Pelelas %.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940). Schulman
v. Ritzenburg, 47 F.RID. 202, 207 (D.D.C. 1969): Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D 472, 496
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); the general inexperience of counsel, Shields v. Valley Natl Bank of Ari-
zona, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449 (D. Ariz. 1971); and the experience of counsel in the particular type
of litigation involved, Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
127. In plaintiff class actions, the courts typically pay little attention to the representa-
tive's sophistication, financial resources, or the amount of his claim. See, e.g., Eisen %.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968); Lamb v. United Sceurity Life Co., 59
F.R.D. 25, 31 (S.D. Iowa 1972). Likewise, nearly every court in %shich the issue has arisen has
held that the competence of plaintiff class counsel should be presumed. See, e.g., Aboudi %,
Daroff, 65 F.R.D. 388, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co.. 55 F.R.D.
519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); City of
Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971). One commentator has pointed
out that a challenge to the class counsel may prove to be a tactical mistake. Donelan. PNe-
requisites to a Class Action under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. IND. & Cost. L REV. 527. 536 (1969).
128. Such inadequacy can concern the quality when the plaintiff appears pro se. see, e.g.,
Ihlenfeldt v. State Election Bd., 425 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Martin v. Middendorf.
420 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1976); Shaffery v. Winters. 72 F.R.D. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1976): Costello
v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. App. 3d 28, 126 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1975). or the character of
representation when the named plaintiff is a lawyer, see, e.g.. Eovaldi v. First Nat'i Bank.
57 F.RD. 545, 546-47 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Shields v. First Natfl Bank. 56 F.R.D. 442 444 (D. Ariz.
1972); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Ariz. 1971).
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then be safeguarded. Courts may also be reluctant to make search-
ing inquiries into such questions as the proficiency of class counsel.
Greater difficulties occur when the class action court assesses
character of representation. Even when there is no party that wants to
contest quality of representation, the court should have little trouble
judging things like the ability of class counsel or the financial capacity
of the representative or what he has at stake in the lawsuit. This is not
true with character of representation. The court can only assuredly
answer questions of similarity between the representative's interest
and the absentees' interest with respect to particular absentees in
collateral proceedings, not in the abstract as the initial court in the
class proceeding must do. Even when quality of representation is at
issue, it is simpler and fairer to determine the adequacy of repre-
sentation after representation is concluded.
There are two potential "safety valves" that stand ready to ques-
tion adequacy with respect to particular absentees when the class ac-
tion court has erred or appears likely to err in gauging adequacy:
collateral attack on adequacy in subsequent proceedings and inter-
vention in the class proceeding by particular class members. 12"
Intervention is more likely in defendant class actions than in plaintiff
class actions. Given the natural inclination to be more concerned
when persons are potentially liable to pay money than when they
are potentially entitled to it, absent defendants will probably inter-
vene to contest adequacy more often than absent plaintiffs. In col-
lateral proceedings, courts have recognized the difficulty a class action
court has in assessing adequacy in the abstract and have conducted
de novo reviews of adequacy.t 30  Where concern for adequacy is
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders . . . requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise tbr
the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given . . . of the opportunity of members
to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action
130. The readiness of the court in the collateral proceeding to sustain a plea of in-
adequacy depends upon the standard of review the court chooses or feels constrained to uti-
lize. The question of the proper standard to apply has been squarely confronted in two cases
involving collateral attacks upon class actions brought under the present federal rule,
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir. 1973), and Research Corp. v. Edward J. Funk
& Sons Co., 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 580 (N.D. Ind. 1971). The appellate court in Gonzalev held
that absent members of the plaintiff class had not been adequately represented, In the original
action, Gaytan v. Cassidy, 317 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. Tex. 1970), vaca,ed, 403 U.S. 902 (1971). the
court had granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiff with respect to a state
statute alleged to have been unconstitutional. The court, however, granted retroactive applica-
tion of the relief only to the named representative, who did not appeal. Declaring the standard
to be "whether the representative, through qualified counsel vigorously and tenaciously pro-
tected the interests of the class," the Fifth Circuit held that the failure to appeal constituted in-
adequate representation. 474 F.2d at 75.
The courts in both Gonzales and Research Corp. conducted a full de novo inquiry into
both aspects of adequacy. The courts adopted the view that the court in the original action iq
ill-equipped to gauge the character or even quality of representation. Moreover, it was felt
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probably greatest-in defendant class actions in which monetary relief
is sought-the winning plaintiff must subsequently bring individual
actions against the absentees to secure judgment for a specific dollar
amount that will bind the absentees. Collateral proceedings are not a
necessary or even a likely consequence when a plaintiff class loses.
V. EXCLUSION
Suits against classes of defendants are mainly useful only to the
extent unnamed parties either cannot or will not exclude themselves
from the actions. Commentators and courts are unanimous in con-
cluding or assuming that absent members of a defendant class are
entitled to exclude themselves from actions brought in federal court
under subdivision (b)(3) of rule 23, the subdivision under which most
defendant class actions for money damages will be brought.'3 ' It is
difficult to reach a contrary conclusion given the plain language of rule
that these questions, particularly the question of character of representation, can best be
answered with respect to a particular person, not in the abstract as the court in the original
proceeding must do. See generally 1954 Harvard Note supra note 85. This standard pre-
vents plaintiff from taking advantage of an erroneous finding with respect to adequacy. It
has been suggested, however, that the standard of review should be lower than de novo
consideration. The value of class actions is said by some to be lost if each member could
in effect relitigate the merits of the case by showing in detail that the class suit %as not
conducted ably enough. Id. at 1065; Note, Federal Class Actions: A Su.Agested Revision of
Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 818, 831 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]. One com-
mentator has gone as far as suggesting that whenever the issue of adequacy of representa-
tion has been actually litigated, "a finding of adequacy by the trial court" in the original
proceeding "should be res judicata as to the adequacy of representation up to that point in the
course of litigation." Note, supra note 39, at 604. The anomaly of making conclusive the
outcome of litigation as to adequacy by a party alleged to be an inadequate representative is
apparent. A weak and ineffectual defendant-representative could hardly be expected to argue
effectively that he is indeed inadequate, particularly when he has little incentive to do so.
Other writers have argued that absent parties should have to show "clear proof" of "gross
error" in the original suit to escape being bound, e.g., 1954 Harvard Note, supra note 85, at
1065. The courts have not appeared to subscribe to any of these views. But ef. Mayor of
Reading v. Winkworth, 146 Eng. Rep. 668 (1818), in which Lord Richards stated that absent
defendants bear the burden of showing that the earlier suit was collusive. Accord, Research
Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal dismissed,
425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
131. See, e.g., 3B MooRe's FEDERAL PRACrICE 23.02-1, at 23-124 (2d ed. 1977). The
language of the other subdivisions would prevent their use for monetary relief. Use of sub-
division (b)(1)(A) as a tool for nondeclaratory relief is possible only %hen the class is plaintiff,
not defendant, as for instance, when one riparian owner as representative of all owners sues to
enjoin or condition the corporation's right to use the dam. It is difficult to imagine an instance
in which prosecution of separate actions "against" a class (rather than "by" a class) would
create incompatible standards of conduct for the class action plaintiff despite the language of
subdivision (b)(l)(A), which covers both situations. For a contrary view see cases discussed
in note 135 infra.
Although subdivision (b)(1)(A) focuses upon potential unfairness to the party opposing
the class, subdivision (b)(l)(B) is aimed at protecting class members. A person cannot, con-
sistent with due process, be bound by judgment in a proceeding to which neither he. his
privies, nor a person adequately representing him is a party. Still when it is not feasible to
confine the effects of judgment to parties in a lawsuit, absent persons may as a practical matter
have their interests concluded or impaired. Subdivision (bXIXB) permits class suits to be
brought when
(I) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of . . . (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
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23: "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances. . . . The notice shall advise each member
that . . . the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests
51132
The obstacle posed by exclusion is not insurmountable in most
instances. When the claims involved are not within the federal court's
exclusive jurisdiction, the simple solution is to bring the action in
state court. Many state class action statutes such as the statute in
Eskaton do not permit exclusion.
133
Moreover, in actions under federal rule 23, exclusion is not uni-
formly permitted. Absentees may not exclude themselves from actions
that are brought under subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(2). t34  Probably for
this reason, several lower federal courts have strained to find de-
fendant class actions that might have been more properly classified
as (b)(3) actions to be proper (b)(1) or (b)(2) actions as well.'35 Nor
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(l)(B) (emphasis added).
Defendant class actions under (b)(l)(B) will only be for declaratory relief for example,
suit by a corporation for a declaration that preemptive rights prescribed by statute or articles
of incorporation do not apply to a particular conveyance of its authorized but unissued stock;
or that certain preferential dividends need not be paia; or that particular options to convert
callable senior securities into noncallable junior securities are not exerciseable once call has
been made; or for relief such as reformation or rescission of a contract or deed. &e, c'g..
Spanner v. Brandt, I F.R.D. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (contract rescission).
Rule 23 (b)(2) encompasses situations in which in the absenc.- of class action treatment, a
person violating the rights of many would otherwise be allowed te continue the violation. 'fle
requirements for maintaining class actions under subdivision (b)(2) are met only when actions
of the party opposing the class, rather than actions of the class itself, make final injunctive relief
appropriate; that is, when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relt
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole," Defendant class
actions under this subdivision are not vehicles for nondeclarotory relief. When, for in-
stance, a number of manufacturers are alleged to have infringed a patent. the patentee may
not properly bring a class suit under this subdivision because it is the actions of the class itsell
that are asserted to justify injunctive relief.
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (emphasis added).
133. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7 § 128 (1958) (also, see ALA. CODE tit. 7, Appendix, Equity
Rule 31, which follows the 1938 Federal Rule 23); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1947). CAL,
CIv. PRO. CODE § 382 (West 1959); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-)05 (West 1960): FLA. SIAT.
ANN, § 1.220 (West 1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (1943); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I Rule 23
(1969); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 233 (1960); S.C. CODE § 10-205 (1962); WIS. STAT, § 260.12 (1957).
134. Exclusion under subdivision (b)(1)(A) would thwart the purpose of that subdivision,
specifically to protect the class opponent against incompatible obligations arising from inconsis-
tent determinations in different suits on the same issues. Because subdivision (b)(1)(13)
protects against absentees being bound as a practical matter by adjudication to which they are
not parties, exclusion would serve no purpose.
135. In Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec.. 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill,
1968) and Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F'. Supp. 497 (N.DIlI, 1969),
appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970), for example, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that a patent holder could maintain a class a:tion under rule 23 (b)(l)(A)
against numerous alleged infringers. See note 75 supra for text of that subdivision. The
district court reasoned that if the patentee had to bring individual suits, it might be prevented
from enforcing the patent against some alleged infringers and not others. Such varying ad-
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are all subdivision (b)(3) class members given the choice of opting
out or being bound; presumably, the rule contemplates that absentees
to whom the prescribed notice of suit and opportunity for exclusion is
sent or directed, but who do not in fact receive notice, are bound to
the same extent as those who receive notice but fail to exclude them-
selves.1
36
Even when exclusion is possible it does not follow that defendants
will uniformly choose to exclude themselves, despite the belief of some
courts and commentators137 that rational defendants would exercise
this prerogative to benefit from collateral estoppel if plaintiff were
to lose but relitigate the issues involved if plaintiff were to win and
subsequently sue the excluded members. Despite the assumptions of
these commentators, 13  it is unlikely that an absentee who excludes
himself will be entitled to benefit later from a decision in the class
suit favorable to the class.
139
Exclusion is not likely in complex commercial litigation in which
large claims are involved. Because defendants in these cases can be
judications would not result in establishment of incompatible standards of conduct, as required
by rule 23 (b)(1)(A), any more than in any instance in which a plaintiff had claims against
more than one defendant. The inconsistency in these patent infringement situations is com-
pletely different from, for example, separate actions by individuals against a municipality to
declare a bond issue invalid.
The district court in Technograph and Research also found that these actions against
classes of alleged patent infringers satisfied the requirements of rule 23 (b)(IXB). The court
reasoned that the ability of defendants that are not parties to an initial proceeding to pro-
tect their interests might be greatly impaired because comity would dictate that prior adjudi-
cations of other courts be accorded significant weight in later actions. Again, the effect of
comity or even stare decisis would be no different from such an effect in any situation in uhich
a common question is at issue among a plaintiff and numerous defendants. The interests of
the class members in the patent infringement example would not be affected in the same
manner that a negative or mandatory injunction secured by a member of a class would operate
to prevent or hinder the opponent of the member in performing claimed duties ow ed other
members of the class.
With respect to subdivision (bX2), the court in Technograph felt that plaintiff had acted
on grounds generally applicable to the whole class by obtaining patents, by notifyving some
alleged infringers, by threatening to bring actions against some alleged infringers, and by
bringing suits against some of them. It is the acts of the members of the class in making
infringing products that make appropriate final injunctive relief, not acts of the plaintiff in
bringing suits.
136. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(cX3) provides:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (bX3), whether
or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to %%hom the
notice provided in subdivision (cX2) vas directed, and who have not requested exclu-
sion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
137. See, e.g., Guy v. Adbulla, 57 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Technitrol, Inc. v. Control
Data Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552 (D. Md. 1970); H. NEWBERG, C.ASS Acrzo.Ns 250 (1977); Illinois
Note, supra note 99, at 494.
138. See, e.g., Comment, Class Actions in Suits for Patent Infringement in Light of
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 13 B.C. l.D. & Cost. L
Rav. 1473, 1499 (1972).
139. On the other side of the coin, it is possible that a person who purposely bypasses an
adequate opportunity to intervene in an action may be bound by the decision in the action.
Cf. Provident Tradesmens Banks & Trust Co. v. Patterson. 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968) (auto-
mobile owner's failure to intervene in the litigation may cause him to lose his rights by his
own inaction).
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fairly sure that individual suits will be brought if plaintiff cannot
proceed by class suit, defendants should prefer the pooling of expenses
that class action permits. Claims brought in federal court where
exclusion is possible-antitrust or patent matters for example 4 -are
likely to be of this complex character. For the same reasons, named
defendants with large potential liability in other cases stand to gain
little by opting out.
If class members begin to opt out, plaintiff can sue them in-
dividually as they do and thus remove avoidance of liability as an
incentive to opt out. The remaining defendants will get the message.
In Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co.,' 41 for ex-
ample, a defendant class action was brought by a class of plaintiffs to
recover a billion dollars for antitrust violations by more than five hun-
dred banks. Many of the smaller banks could not have afforded the
legal fees this complex litigation would have required and hence would
not likely have risked being sued individually.
When the defendant class action is in federal court, individual
suits against excluded absentees should not be very costly, even when
absentees must be sued in another state. Litigation initiated against
excluded class members may be transferred to a single forum under
28 U.S.C. § 1407 and consolidated with the original class action for
all pretrial purposes. The tactic of suing excluded class members
will be particularly useful when suing defendants individually would
have been economically feasible in the first instance but class action
was chosen for reasons of jurisdiction, venue, statute of limitations,
or avoidance of collateral estoppel or incompatible decrees.
VI. CONCLUSION
The defendant class action has been available for centuries. Its
availability has not been well known, however, and its use has been
misunderstood. At times, the defendant class action may be the most
attractive and most feasible way to proceed.
This article has attempted to demonstrate that many of the
problems in bringing a defendant class action are not as severe as
some commentators have thought. Perhaps the most crucial problem
is assuring adequate representation. The motives of the defendant-
representatives will contribute to a certain extent toward assuring
adequate representation. The courts also have some flexibility to
assure that absent defendants are protected. The problem of exclusion
as well should not prevent the effective use of this procedure.
Although the defendant class action is not free from problems,
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970) (patent and copyright). Exclusivity under antitrust
actions has been determined by judicial decision.
141. 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. I1. 1973).
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the difficulties are no more insurmountable than those inherent in
plaintiff class actions. And the advantages of a defendant class action
oftentimes outweigh the problems. The defendant class action can
result in judicial economy by resolving complex issues in one pro-
ceeding. It can also prevent unfairness and needless expense for
both plaintiffs and defendants without sacrificing procedural due
process.

